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I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2014, Russian-backed forces seized control of Crimea, an
autonomous territory of Ukraine, leading to an ongoing conflict
between Russia and Ukraine.1 On May 15, 2017, Ukrainian
President Petro Poroshenko signed a presidential decree banning
Russian-run social media, email, and search engine services for three
years.2 The ban applied to the social media sites VKontakte (VK)
1. See
Crimea
Profile,
BBC
NEWS
(Apr.
21,
2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18287223 (explaining that the annexation
of Crimea was “the focus of the worst East-West crisis since the Cold War” when
Russian-backed forces seized control of Crimea after the territory voted to become
part of Russia in a referendum deemed illegal by Ukraine).
2. Alec Luhn, Ukraine Blocks Popular Social Networks as Part of Sanctions
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and Odnoklassniki, the email service Mail.ru, and the search engine
Yandex.3 These social media sites are widely used by the Ukrainian
population with almost eighty percent of Ukrainian internet users
signed up for VK and nearly twenty-one million Ukrainians using
one of the two banned social media sites.4 Mail.ru estimated that
twenty-six million Ukrainian users would be impacted by the ban.5
Altogether, these four Russian websites are among the top ten most
popular websites in Ukraine.6
International actors like Human Rights Watch and the Council of
Europe condemned Ukraine’s ban, insisting that it is a violation of
commonly understood freedoms and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Ukraine is a party.7
The ICCPR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
in 1966 and entered into force in 1976.8 It is an international human
on Russia, GUARDIAN (May 16, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/may/16/ukraine-blocks-popular-russian-websites-kremlin-role-war.
3. Id.
4. Isobel Koshiw, Backlash Grows Against Ukraine’s Attempts to Block
Russian Social Media, CODA STORY (May 18, 2017), https://codastory.com/
disinformation-crisis/information-war/backlash-grows-against-ukraine-s-attemptsto-block-russian-social-media.
5. Andrew Roth, In New Sanctions List, Ukraine Targets Russian SocialMedia Sites, WASH. POST (May 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/in-new-sanctions-list-ukraine-blocks-russian-social-mediasites/2017/05/16/a982ab4e-3a16-11e7-9e48c4f199710b69_story.html?utm_term=.993e144a00a8.
6. Luhn, supra note 2.
7. See Interfax-Ukraine, Council of Europe: Sanctions on Russian Sites
Violate Media Freedom Principles, KYIV POST (May 17, 2017, 2:37 PM),
https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/council-europe-sanctions-russian-sitesviolate-media-freedom-principles.html (citing Council of Europe SecretaryGeneral Thorbjorn Jagland as saying that the ban “goes against our common
understanding of freedom of expression and freedom of the media”); see also
Ukraine: Revoke Ban on Dozens of Russian Web Companies, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(May 16, 2017, 11:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/16/ukraine-revokeban-dozens-russian-web-companies (determining that Ukraine is in violation of the
ICCPR); Chapter IV Human Rights: 4. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION [hereinafter ICCPR
Signatories, Reservations, and Objections], https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited
June 18, 2017) (showing Ukraine as both a signatory and a party to the ICCPR).
8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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rights treaty ratified to preserve and protect basic civil and political
rights.9 ICCPR Article 19 specifically protects rights and freedoms
related to opinion, expression, and information and idea gathering
and dissemination.10
However, Article 19 does provide for
exceptions where such freedoms would impact the rights of others or
impede national security, public order, health, or morals.11
This Comment argues that under ICCPR Article 19, Ukraine, as a
signatory, is obligated to maintain its citizens’ rights to freedom of
opinion and expression, as well as rights to receive and impart
information through any media platform. By barring citizen access
to certain social media sites, email services, and search engines,
without a sufficient national security justification, Ukraine has
violated its obligations under the ICCPR.
Part II of this Comment describes Ukraine’s actions in banning
particular social media and internet access, and Ukraine’s
commitments to the ICCPR.12 Part II of this Comment also provides
an overview of ICCPR Article 19, as well as the United Nations
Human Rights Council’s Resolution condemning governmental
restrictions of Internet and social media.13 Part III of this Comment
compares the language of Article 19 and Human Rights Council
Resolution 32/13 to Ukraine’s social media ban and the claim that
the ban fits under the national security exception to the ICCPR.14
Part III will assess the legality of Ukraine’s ban in relation to internet
bans by other countries that have been condemned by the United
Nations.15 Part IV recommends that the United Nations should issue
a general comment condemning Ukraine’s website ban.16
Furthermore, this Comment recommends that Ukraine should cease
implementation of its ban and consider developing and encouraging
non-Russian social media options.17
9. FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR), AM. C.L. UNION
(Apr. 2014), https://www.aclu.org/other/faq-covenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr.
10. ICCPR, supra note 8, at 178.
11. Id.
12. See discussion infra Part II.A.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
14. See discussion infra Part III.D.
15. See discussion infra Part III.C.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. AN OVERVIEW OF UKRAINE’S PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
On May 15, 2017, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed
Presidential Decree No. 133/2017 banning Ukrainian access to
Russian Internet, email, and social media platforms.18 The ban
applies to the social media sites VK and Odnoklassniki, the email
service Mail.ru, and the search engine Yandex.19 Presidential Decree
No. 133/2017 enacted a National Security and Defense Council
(NSDC) decision from April 28, 2017.20 According to President
Poroshenko, the ban will remain in place for the next three years, or
“after the termination of Russian aggression against Ukraine.”21 One
member of the Ukrainian parliament has called into question the
legality of the decree saying that under Ukrainian law “blocking
access to sites without a court decision is not allowed.”22 This
question of legality has not slowed the development of mechanisms
to stop access to banned sites.23

18. Iryna Nikolayevska, Ukraine Expands Sanctions Against Russia to Social
Media and IT Sectors, LEXOLOGY (May 23, 2017), http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=5651eefb-d0a7-4721-8fce-5bdcfac933d6.
19. Id.
20. President on the Blocking of Russian Online Resources: When the Last
Russian Soldier Leaves the Territory of Ukraine, We Will Be Ready to Revise Our
Decision, PRESIDENTIAL ADMIN. UKR. (May 17, 2017, 5:08 PM) [hereinafter
Presidential Administration Statement], http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/koliostannij-rosijskij-soldat-pokine-teritoriyu-ukrayini-mi-41426; see also Ukraine:
Revoke Ban on Dozens of Russian Web Companies, supra note 7 (expanding the
list of those sanctioned as a result of the conflict “to 1,228 individuals and 468
legal entities in Russia, Russia-occupied Crimea, areas in eastern Ukraine’s
Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by Russia-backed separatists, and other
countries”).
21. Presidential Administration Statement, supra note 20 (quoting President
Poroshenko’s statement on implementation of the decree).
22. Luhn, supra note 2 (quoting Mykhailo Chaplyga’s comment to the news
agency UNIAN).
23. See id. (explaining that the NSDC has ordered the Cabinet of Ministers,
National Security Service, and the National Bank of Ukraine “to develop a
mechanism to stop access” to the banned sites, and noting that one major internet
service provider in Ukraine, Ukrtelecom, was moving forward with the blocking
process).
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1. Ukraine’s National Security Justifications
Ukraine’s justifications for the ban stem from concern about
Russian propaganda, data collection, and cyberattacks.24
Ukrainian officials claim the ban is necessary because Russianowned internet sites help to spread Russian propaganda, presenting
pro-Russian views and hiding unfavorable news regarding the
Russian government.25 In one example, Yandex, which claims
objectivity in news aggregation, shared nothing on its news site, until
the following day, when thousands of Russians around the country
protested against government corruption in March 2017.26 Yandex
claimed that this omission occurred because its algorithms relied on
reports from the bigger media organizations which largely tend to be
under government control.27
With regard to VK, the social media site is traditionally home to a
more pro-Russian audience and is the preferred choice of eastern
Ukrainian separatists “who mistrust U.S.-owned social networks and
like Vkontakte’s better Russian-language interfaces.”28 Pro-Russian
content on VK could be attributed to “filter bubbles and information
silos” in which users are largely choosing what information they

24. See Roth, supra note 5 (noting that Ukraine’s Security and Defense Council
justified the ban as a mechanism for protecting citizens from companies that
threaten Ukraine’s cyber security and information); see also ICCPR, supra note 8,
at 178 (establishing a prohibition of propaganda for war under Article 20; however,
as discussed in this paper, propaganda is used to describe pro-Russia information
the Ukrainian government considers to be harmful, but is not necessarily
propaganda of war).
25. See Leonid Bershidsky, Why Ukraine Said ‘Nyet’ to Russian Social
Networks, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2017, 9:54 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
view/articles/2017-05-17/why-ukraine-said-nyet-to-russian-social-networks
(contextualizing Ukraine’s problem with VK and Yandex as preferred platforms
for pro-Russian Ukrainians and noting that these platforms do allow for
information selection that fuels pro-Russian information).
26. Alexey Kovalev, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Report No Evil, MOSCOW
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017, 10:03 PM), https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/hear-noevil-see-no-evil-report-no-evil-57550.
27. See Bershidsky, supra note 25 (citing a Yandex press release explaining
that the company’s algorithm can only use stories produced by officially registered
media outlets).
28. Id.
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wish to see and with whom they wish to interact.29 VK does not
delete violent, anti-Ukrainian posts, which the Ukrainian
Government may consider to be an approval of propaganda.30 The
Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security Council, Oleksandr
Turchynov, claimed that the social media sites are being used for
Russian security services’ recruitment and illegal collection of user
data.31
The Ukrainian government also states the ban is needed to prevent
data collection. The Ukrainian Security Service released a statement
saying “Russian security agencies are waging a hybrid war against
the Ukrainian population, using in their special information
operations Internet resources such as VK, Odnoklassniki, Mail.ru,
and so on.”32 Furthermore, some Ukrainian politicians have
supported the ban, citing the risk of Russian access to the social
media data of soldiers and state employees.33 However, ordinary
Ukrainian users do not have access to secret information and pose no
security risks.34
Finally, the Ukrainian government argues that the ban on Russian
internet sites relates to deterring and defending against Russian
cyberattacks.35 On his own official VK page, President Poroshenko
noted recent cyberattacks around the world, particularly Russian
29. Id.; see also Megan Burnside, Are You a Victim of Media Silos or Silo
Mentality?, LEXISNEXIS: BIZ BLOG (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.lexisnexis.com/
communities/lexisnexis_biz/b/bizblog/archive/2015/12/31/are-you-a-victim-ofsilos-or-silo-mentality.aspx (explaining that information silos occur when
individuals only receive pieces of information from specific sources based on their
interests).
30. See Bershidsky, supra note 25 (finding that this policy distinguishes VK
from similar social media websites like Facebook).
31. Koshiw, supra note 4.
32. Christopher Miller, Public Sharply Divided Over Ukraine’s Ban on Russian
Social Networks, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (May 17, 2017 1:45 PM),
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-ban-russia-social-networks-slammedpraised/28493634.html.
33. Luhn, supra note 2 (citing MP Volodymyr Ariev).
34. Miller, supra note 32 (citing Andrei Soldatov in explaining that VK is
intrusive and cooperates with the Russian government but is not a security threat).
35. See Nolan Peterson, Ukraine Shuts Down Putin’s Facebook, NEWSWEEK
(May 19, 2017, 12:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-shuts-downputins-facebook-611809 (noting Ukrainian statements on the need for this ban as a
movement toward cybersecurity).
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interference with the French election and Russian propaganda, as
reasons for the implementation of the ban.36 After Poroshenko
released the statement on his VK page, Poroshenko claimed that an
organized Russian cyberattack hit his official website.37
In the cyberwar with Russia, hackers have targeted Ukraine, with
one report from Ukraine noting that, in a two month window in 2016,
Ukrainian state institutions were hit approximately 6,500 times by
hackers.38 President Poroshenko released statements claiming the
Russian government was either directly or indirectly involved in
these cyberattacks; however, Russia denies any involvement.39
While Ukraine may conceivably claim that Russia committed these
cyberattacks, the Russian internet platform ban does not seem to be
tied to protecting Ukraine from future attacks because the attacks
against Ukraine did not occur through Russian-owned internet sites.40
2. Potential Impacts of the Ban on Ukrainian Citizens
As mentioned above, VK, Odnoklassniki, Mail.ru, and Yandex are
widely used throughout Ukraine.41 While social media options like
Facebook are not banned from the country, there are concerns
regarding the expression of opinions that particularly take place on
36. Bershidsky, supra note 25; see also Peterson, supra note 35 (noting that, in
another statement, Poroshenko claimed that Russia employs “so-called ‘fake
news,’ computer hacking, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, snap drills, direct
military interventions, and so on and so forth—to undermine the Western
democracies and break the transatlantic unity”).
37. Ukraine President’s Site ‘Attacked by Russia’, BBC NEWS (May 16, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39944158.
38. Natalia Zinets, Ukraine Hit by 6,500 Hack Attacks, Sees Russian
‘Cyberwar’, REUTERS (Dec. 29, 2016, 1:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-ukraine-crisis-cyber-idUSKBN14I1QC (explaining that these attacks
harmed Kiev’s power grid leading to a blackout in part of the capital and stopped
the State Treasury’s system, among other things).
39. Id.
40. See Bershidsky, supra note 25 (citing President Poroshenko’s statements
blaming Russia for cyberattacks and indicating that Russia’s general attacks
against Ukraine and other nations, rather than attacks through Russian-owned
social media and internet platforms, warranted the ban).
41. See Koshiw, supra note 4 (remarking on the millions of people with
accounts on the banned social media sites); Luhn, supra note 2 (explaining that all
four banned sites are in the list of the top ten most popular internet sites in
Ukraine); Roth, supra note 5 (noting the popularity of Mail.ru).

2018]

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND OPINION IN WARTIME

951

VK and Odnoklassniki.42 Freedom House analyst Matthew Schaaf
explained that, while Kiev-based Ukrainians may use other social
media platforms, “fellow Ukrainians in other parts of the country
depend disproportionately on Russian-made platforms such as
Odnoklassniki.”43 Regardless of access to alternative sites, people
have less access to discussion, news, and information on varied and
important political and social issues.44 While these sites can attract
pro-Russia users who are self-selected into pro-Russia information
bubbles, these actions are still a form of freedom of expression and
opinion which should be respected in Ukraine.45
The ban could also be considered dangerous with consequences in
eastern Ukraine. According to journalist Aric Toler, “residents and
authorities rely on Vkontakte posts to disseminate the latest reports
on the fighting.”46 Furthermore, concern for small businesses that
cannot afford to develop social media software (or other software
banned by decree) on their own has led to outcry from Ukrainian
businesses.47

B. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
42. See Damien Sharkov, Ukrainians Join Facebook by the Millions After
Russian Social Media Ban, NEWSWEEK (June 20, 2017, 7:11 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/ukrainians-join-facebook-millions-russian-socialmedia-ban-627488 (explaining that two and a half million Ukrainian accounts have
been created on Facebook since May 2017); see also US Scrutinizes Ukraine Ban
on Russian Websites, VOA NEWS (May 19, 2017, 10:16 AM),
https://www.voanews.com/a/us-scrutinizes-ukraine-ban-on-russianwebsites/3858894.html (noting that Russian-made social media sites have better
Russian-language platforms and can attract individuals critical of Ukraine’s
government).
43. US Scrutinizes Ukraine Ban on Russian Websites, supra note 42.
44. Id.
45. See Bershidsky, supra note 25 (noting that VK is the preferred platform for
eastern Ukrainian separatists who mistrust U.S.-owned social networks); see also
Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34,
at 2 (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter General Comment No. 34] (explaining that under
ICCPR Article 19 all forms of opinion and the means of their dissemination are
protected).
46. Koshiw, supra note 4.
47. See Luhn, supra note 2 (explaining that the decree also bans software
important to Ukrainian businesses including blocking “the site of the Russian
cybersecurity giant Kaspersky Labs . . . as well as the popular business software
developer 1C”).
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CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
was adopted and opened for signature and ratification by U.N.
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) on December 16, 1966
and entered force on March 23, 1976.48 Under the ICCPR, each state
commits to the enjoyment of civil and political freedom by all human
beings and the creation of conditions in which all humans can enjoy
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.49
Article 19 affirms that everyone has the right to “hold opinions
without interference” and the right to “freedom of expression.”50
Paragraph two of Article 19 establishes a right to expression,
including the “freedom to seek, receive[,] and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.”51 However, under
Article 19(3), states may restrict freedom of expression “[f]or respect
of the rights or reputations of others,” and “[f]or the protection of
national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health
or morals.”52
1. Ukraine as a Party to the ICCPR
Ukraine signed the ICCPR on March 20, 1968 and ratified it on
November 12, 1973.53 Ukraine made its declaration recognizing the
competence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) under
Article 41 on July 28, 1992.54 Ukraine’s parliament has not yet
48.
49.
50.
51.

ICCPR, supra note 8, at 171.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id. at 178; see also KATIE BRESNER, UNDERSTANDING THE RIGHT TO
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PRIMER FOR JOURNALISTS 28
(Renu Mandhane, Bonnie Allen & Naregh Galoustian eds., 2015),
http://www.jhr.ca/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Understanding-Freedom-ofExpression-Primer-ENG-web.pdf (defining “frontiers” to extend beyond national
boundaries).
52. See ICCPR, supra note 8, at 178 (noting that freedom of expression carries
special duties and responsibilities and is thus subject to restrictions); see also
General Comment No. 34, supra note 45, ¶ 35 (explaining that the national
security exception can only be claimed where an individualized and targeted
restrictive action is taken as a response to a specified security threat).
53. ICCPR Signatories, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 7.
54. Id.
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passed legislation that would allow for victims of violations of the
ICCPR to seek remedy.55 While the Ukrainian Parliament registered
draft legislation in May 2015, it was largely unsupported by the
government.56 However, ICCPR enforcement in Ukraine could
occur through the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, which
Ukraine ratified in 1991.57 The First Optional Protocol allows the
HRC to receive and review communications from individuals
claiming to be victims of a violation by a state party.58
2. Scope of the ICCPR
The ICCPR’s scope is outlined in Article 2 which requires that
each state party adopt the laws necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the ICCPR.59 Furthermore, state parties are expected
to provide a private right of action for any individuals whose rights
are violated under the ICCPR.60
The HRC monitors state party implementation of the ICCPR.61
State parties must submit reports regarding compliance roughly
every four years.62 Once reports are examined, the HRC issues
55. HUMAN RIGHTS HOUSE FOUNDATION, UKRAINE: FOLLOW-UP REPORT TO
THE REVIEW UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 4 (May 2016), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20

Documents/UKR/INT_CCPR_NGS_UKR_24405_E.pdf.
56. Id.
57. Chapter IV Human Rights: 5. Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION
[hereinafter First Optional Protocol Ratification], https://treaties.un.org/
pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en
(last
visited June 18, 2017).
58. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, 302 [hereinafter First Optional
Protocol of the ICCPR].
59. ICCPR, supra note 8, at 173-74.
60. See id.; see also OFFICE HIGH COMM’R HUMAN RIGHTS, COMPILATION OF
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSED TO UKRAINE 1
(2017), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UN_recommendations_
Ukraine.pdf.
61. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, EQUAL. &
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-humanrights-work/monitoring-and-promoting-un-treaties/international-covenant-civil-and
(last visited June 23, 2017) (noting that the HRC is an eighteen-member committee
made up of independent experts from around the world).
62. Id.
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observations on the state party’s implementation of the ICCPR.63
The HRC may make recommendations on any remedial actions
necessary to correct deficiencies in implementation.64 The HRC also
issues general comments extensively analyzing ICCPR issues with
the aim of clarifying the ICCPR’s provisions.65 Under the First
Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, the HRC may directly consider
communications with those claiming to be victims of ICCPR
violations.66 The HRC reviews all information received then issues a
finding on whether a state party violated the ICCPR.67
3. Complying with Article 19 of the ICCPR
Article 19 establishes rights to opinion and expression, including
the right to “seek, receive[,] and impart information and ideas of all
kinds” through any form of media.68 The interpretation of “media”
has been expanded to encompass the internet by HRC General
Comment No. 34.69 The HRC explained that state parties “should
take all necessary steps to foster the independence of these new
media and to ensure access of individuals thereto.”70 Freedom of
expression on the internet is, therefore, necessary to realize the
transparency and accountability essential to the promotion of human
rights.71
Furthermore, Comment No. 34 elaborates on permitted national
security restrictions, stating that restrictions must not suppress
information of legitimate public interest and must be legal,

63. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., http://www.who.int/hhr/Civil_political_rights.pdf (last visited June 23,
2017).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, supra note 58, at 302 (noting that a
citizen’s state must be a party to the Protocol to invoke this privilege).
67. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., supra note 63, at 3.
68. ICCPR, supra note 8, at 178.
69. General Comment No. 34, supra note 45, ¶ 12.
70. See id. ¶ 15 (explaining that development of the internet has changed
communication practices leading to “a global network for exchanging ideas and
opinions”).
71. Id. ¶ 3.
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necessary, and proportional.72 In order to meet the proportionality
requirement, a state party’s restrictive measures must be “appropriate
to achieve their protective function; they must be the least intrusive
instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective
function; [and] they must be proportionate to the interest to be
protected.”73
To demonstrate that a restriction is necessary, a state party must
show that protection achieved through its restrictive measure could
not be achieved in other ways that do not restrict freedom of
expression.74 Altogether, a state party claiming a national security
justification must “demonstrate in [a] specific and individualized
fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the necessity and
proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by
establishing a direct and immediate connection between the
expression and the threat.”75 The HRC maintains the ability to assess
for itself the circumstances of restrictions of freedoms under Article
19’s national security exception.76
a. Human Rights Council Resolution 32/13 and Internet Access as
Important to Freedom of Expression and Opinion
On July 1, 2016, the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution
32/13, which condemned internet disruption and recognized the
internet as a facet of the right to freedom of expression.77 The
Resolution recognized that parties to the ICCPR must address
national security concerns in accordance with the ICCPR’s
obligations and condemned state measures intended to “prevent or
72. See id. ¶¶ 25, 27, 34 (explaining that, for a restriction to be legal and
characterized as a law under the ICCPR, it must not “confer unfettered discretion
for the restriction of freedom of expression on those charged with its execution,”
and the ICCPR requires that state parties show sufficient legal basis for any
restrictions by providing “details of the law and of actions that fall within the scope
of the law”).
73. Id. ¶ 34 (quoting Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 27,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/Rev.1/Add.9, ¶ 14 (Nov. 2, 1999)).
74. Id. ¶ 33.
75. General Comment No. 34, supra note 45, ¶ 35.
76. Id. ¶ 36.
77. Human Rights Council Res. 32/13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/L.20, ¶¶ 8, 10
(June 27, 2016).
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disrupt access to or dissemination of information online, in violation
of international human rights law.”78
The internet has become an important tool for expression in the
modern age as it allows people to communicate freely and globally.79
With many people relying on it daily, the internet provides
individuals with an unprecedented number of resources, opening up
countless opportunities for new expression.80 Through social media,
information is processed and disseminated around the world in
seconds, and citizens are better able to hold their governments
accountable.81 Resolution 32/13 understood the importance of
internet access in protecting the rights of expression and opinion as
established under the ICCPR.82
i. Requirements of Parties to Human Rights Council Res. 32/13
Under Resolution 32/13, state parties are encouraged to adopt
“national Internet-related public policies that have the objective of
universal access.”83
While Resolution 32/13 is technically
nonbinding, it informs the Human Rights Council’s understanding of
“expression” under the ICCPR and is considered useful in
encouraging certain actions through public pressure.84 Importantly,
Ukraine is a signatory to Resolution 32/13.85
ii. Examples of Nations Condemned under ICCPR and Res. 32/13
78. Id. ¶ 10.
79. See Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Balancing Freedom of Speech on the Internet
Under International Law, 39 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 701, 754 (2014)
(discussing the growth of the internet and internet governance under current
international human rights law and the development of online information-sharing
communities).
80. Id. at 722.
81. Id. at 725.
82. See Human Rights Council Res. 32/13, supra note 77, ¶ 1 (reaffirming the
internet’s role in exercising human rights and the need for protecting internet
access as recognized under the ICCPR).
83. Id. ¶ 12.
84. Id.; see also Mario Trujillo, UN Rights Council Condemns Internet
Blocking, HILL (July 1, 2016, 9:21 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/
technology/286236-un-rights-council-condemns-internet-blocking (celebrating the
resolution for condemning countries that disrupt access to the internet).
85. Human Rights Council Res. 32/13, supra note 77.
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for Internet Restrictions Despite Article 19(3) Claims
The U.N. has released reports and statements condemning Turkey,
India, and Cameroon due to their internet restriction practices.86 In
Turkey, through amendments to its Constitution and decrees issued
by the Council of Ministers, the government has the ability to shut
down internet networks and social media as it sees fit for national
security.87 Turkey claims that its refugee crisis, recent attempted
coup, and fight against terrorism justify its actions under Article
19(3).88
In particular, Turkey has implemented media and internet blocks
in regions impacted by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).89 The Special Rapporteur on
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression preliminarily concluded that Turkey could justify
restrictions under Article 19(3), but the expansiveness of the
86. See Preliminary Conclusions and Observations by the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression to His Visit to
Turkey, 14-18 November 2016, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE HIGH
COMM’R (Nov. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Preliminary Conclusions and Observations
on
Turkey],
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=20891&LangID=E; India Must Restore Internet and Social Media
Networks in Jammu and Kashmir, Say UN Rights Experts, UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE HIGH COMM’R (May 11, 2017) [hereinafter U.N.
Condemnation
of
India
Internet
Restrictions],
http://ohchr.org/
EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21604&LangID=E;
UN
Expert Urges Cameroon to Restore Internet Services Cut Off in Rights Violation,
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE HIGH COMM’R (Feb. 10, 2017)
[hereinafter U.N. Condemnation of Cameroon Internet Restrictions],
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21165
&LangID=E.
87. See Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note 86
(noting that government officials emphasized threats faced by Turkey, including a
July 15, 2016 coup attempt, as reasoning for internet restrictions); see also UN
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression on His Mission to
Turkey, ¶¶ 5, 14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/22/Add.3 (June 7, 2017) [hereinafter
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Turkey] (discussing the application of the
right to freedom of expression online and citing the example of Turkey’s
shutdowns as not meeting the Turkish government’s stated national security
purposes).
88. Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note 86.
89. Id.
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restrictions moved Turkey away from consideration as a “genuinely
democratic society” and did not meet the requirements of “legality,
necessity, and proportionality.”90 In the Special Rapporteur’s final
report on Turkey, released on June 7, 2017, the HRC determined that
Turkey had blocked over 100,000 websites as of March 2017.91
This, among other factors, led to the determination that Turkey is
dealing with a freedom of information crisis.92 While Turkey could
meet the requirement of necessity, the Turkish policy did not meet
the proportionality requirement as established under Comment No.
34.93
The U.N. has also released statements urging India and Cameroon,
both of which are parties to the ICCPR, to stop their restrictive
internet practices.94 India imposed widespread bans on social media
and mobile internet services in Kashmir and Jammu following
widespread student protests on April 17, 2017.95 United Nations
human rights experts said in a statement that the ban was
characteristic of punishment and failed “to meet the standards
required under international human rights law to limit freedom of
expression” under a valid exception.96 According to the experts,
“[t]he scope of these restrictions has a significantly disproportionate
impact on the fundamental rights of everyone in Kashmir,
undermining the Government’s stated aim of preventing
dissemination of information that could lead to violence.” 97
In Cameroon, the government reportedly cut off internet access to
90. Id.
91. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Turkey, supra note 87, ¶¶ 49, 75.
92. Id. ¶¶ 49, 75, 80.
93. See generally General Comment No. 34, supra note 45, ¶ 34 (explaining
the requirement of proportionality for an Article 19(3) national security exception).
94. U.N. Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86; U.N.
Condemnation of Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86; see also ICCPR
Signatories, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 7 (showing that India
became party to the ICCPR by ascension in 1979, and Cameroon became party by
ascension in 1984).
95. U.N. Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86 (noting
that the Indian government “blocked access to 22 websites and applications,
including WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter,” as well as mobile phone data
services).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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its northwest and southwest regions in January 2017.98 This internet
shutdown followed widespread protests regarding the government’s
poor treatment of its English-speaking population.99 David Kaye,
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression, explained that the scale of the
network shutdown violated international law because “it not only
suppresse[d] public debate, but also deprive[d] Cameroonians of
access to essential services and basic resources.”100 Both statements
urging India and Cameroon to cease their internet and social media
shutdowns cited the importance of Resolution 32/13 in condemning
online disruptions.101
These three nations, as parties to the ICCPR, were publicly
condemned by the U.N. for their restrictive practices in violation of
the ICCPR.102 While India and Turkey continue their restrictive
internet practices, Cameroon did lift its internet restrictions in its
English-speaking northwest and southwest regions following the
HRC’s press release and subsequent international pressure
condemning the restrictions.103
The international community
continues to pressure India and Turkey by using the U.N.’s public
statements as evidence of these nations’ unlawful actions.104

98. U.N. Condemnation of Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86
(noting that “English speakers have long reported that they face discrimination and
marginalization,” and the internet shutdown occurred in predominantly Englishspeaking regions).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. U.N. Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86; U.N.
Condemnation of Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86.
102. ICCPR Signatories, Reservations, and Objections, supra note 7 (listing
these states as ICCPR members).
103. Yomi Kazeem, The Internet Shutdown in English-Speaking Parts of
Cameroon
Is
Finally
Over,
QUARTZ AFR.
(Apr.
20,
2017),
https://qz.com/964927/caemroons-internet-shutdown-is-over-after-93-days/;
see
also India: 20 Internet Shutdowns in 2017, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 15, 2017,
10:15 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/15/india-20-internet-shutdowns2017 (criticizing India for continued internet shutdowns through June 2017).
104. See India: 20 Internet Shutdowns in 2017, supra note 103 (listing India’s
restrictive practices and citing to U.N. Special Rapporteur David Kaye’s
statements on India’s actions as violative).
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ANALYSIS

Freedom of speech and expression is a fundamental human right
understood in international human rights law through the ICCPR.105
The internet is a platform for global communication in which
information is “exchanged, collected, aggregated, and disseminated
in a split second” across the world and citizens are able to “hold their
own government accountable, generate new ideas, and encourage
creativity and entrepreneurship.”106 Furthermore, Comment No. 34
and Resolution 32/13 understand freedom of expression on the
internet to be necessary for the realization of governmental
transparency and accountability.107
In the case of Ukraine, the restriction on citizens’ rights to
freedom of expression and access to information on Russian-owned
platforms violates the ICCPR and Resolution 32/13 because Ukraine
cannot establish a legitimate state interest that would allow exception
to these rights.108 The restrictions also risk the safety of its citizenry
with little evidence of proportionality or legality under its own legal
system.109

A. UKRAINE’S SANCTIONS DECREE VIOLATES ARTICLE 19 OF THE
ICCPR BECAUSE IT LIMITS INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
As articulated above, ICCPR Article 19, Comment No. 34, and
Resolution 32/13 have established the U.N.’s disapproval of state
measures intended to disrupt freedom of expression and information
access.110 Ukraine’s Russian Internet site ban is a limitation of its
citizens’ ability to express themselves and seek, impart, and consume
information on VK, Odnoklassniki, Mail.ru, and Yandex.111 While
citizens may still access sites like Facebook and Twitter, the
Russian-owned sites feature different Russian-language friendly
105. See ICCPR, supra note 8, at 178.
106. Sangsuvan, supra note 79, at 725.
107. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 45, ¶ 3.
108. See discussion infra Part III.B-D.
109. See discussion infra Part III.B-D.
110. See ICCPR, supra note 8, at 178; General Comment No. 34, supra note 45,
¶ 12; Human Rights Council Res. 32/13, supra note 77.
111. Luhn, supra note 2.
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platforms with different online communities.112 These communities
may express sentiments that are contrary to the preferences of
Ukraine’s government, but within the ICCPR’s language, Ukraine
cannot censor simply because it disagrees with the information being
shared on these widely popular platforms.113 Ukraine is preventing
access to and dissemination of information online in violation of the
ICCPR, HRC General Comment No. 34, and Human Rights Council
Resolution 32/13.114
Ukraine claims that this access restriction is a national security
action and would thus be excepted under Article 19(3)’s national
security provision.115 However, Ukraine fails to meet the established
standard of legality, necessity, and proportionality for the national
security exception.116 The nations of Turkey, India, and Cameroon
similarly tried to claim the exception and similarly failed to
demonstrate that their restrictions met the standard.117

112. Bershidsky, supra note 25; see also Peter Dickinson, Russian language in
Ukraine, BUS. UKR. (May 30, 2017), http://bunews.com.ua/society/item/therussian-language-in-ukraine (interviewing Julia Kazdobina, analyst at the
Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, noting that most of Ukraine’s
population can communicate in Russian and Ukrainian, but many of Ukraine’s
largest cities are predominantly Russian-speaking).
113. ICCPR, supra note 8, at 178; see also Bershidsky, supra note 25 (showing
how social media sites are used by Ukrainians to express pro-Russian views);
Dickinson, supra note 112 (“[M]any of Ukraine’s Russian speakers live in the
conflict zone and some of them do indeed embrace . . . messages that Russians and
Ukrainians are one people and Ukrainian independence is an aberration. Many
welcomed the Russian aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.”).
114. ICCPR, supra note 8, at 178; General Comment No. 34, supra note 45;
Human Rights Council Res. 32/13, supra note 77.
115. See Valentin Petrov: Some Russian Services Pose a Direct Threat to the
National Security of Ukraine, and This is Why the State Limits Their Operation,
NAT’L SECURITY & DEF. COUNCIL OF UKR. (May 19, 2017),
http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/en/news/2773.html (“Restrictive measures (sanctions)
were imposed not against services or software but against legal entities or
individuals that threaten the national security of Ukraine.”).
116. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 45, ¶¶ 33-35.
117. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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B. UKRAINE’S SOCIAL MEDIA AND INTERNET RESTRICTIONS
VIOLATE ICCPR ARTICLE 19 IN COMPARISON TO CONDEMNED
RESTRICTIONS IN TURKEY, INDIA, AND CAMEROON
Ukraine’s internet and social media ban shares similarities with
the Turkish, Indian, and Cameroonian bans criticized by the U.N.
and other international actors.118 The Turkey report discussed an
Article 19 violation while the HRC’s press releases discussing
Cameroon and India cited Resolution 32/12.119 All of these
references to Article 19 affirm the obligation to respect freedom of
expression in ICCPR signatory countries.120 Turkey faced a threat
from outside actors in implementing portions of its bans, whereas
Cameroon’s ban targeted a domestic group that spoke a particular
language.121 India, on the other hand, directed internet restrictions
toward Jammu and Kashmir following student protests and political
unrest in the regions.122 Regardless of the target group, all three
countries clearly implemented bans against those who challenged the
government.123
118. Ukraine: Revoke Ban on Dozens of Russian Web Companies, supra note 7;
Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note 86; U.N.
Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86; U.N. Condemnation of
Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86.
119. Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note 86; U.N.
Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86; U.N. Condemnation of
Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86.
120. Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note 86; U.N.
Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86; U.N. Condemnation of
Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86.
121. See Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note 86
(detailing the UN Special Rapporteur’s findings regarding the freedoms of Turkish
journalists); U.N. Condemnation of Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86.
122. See U.N. Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86
(calling on the Indian government to promptly end the ban and restore the
guarantee of freedom of expression).
123. See Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note 86
(contextualizing conditions in Turkey leading to Internet restrictions including the
July 15, 2016 coup attempt, attacks by ISIS and the PKK, and refugee crisis); see
also U.N. Condemnation of Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86
(explaining that the shutdown occurred “against a background of widespread
protests against government policies which have reportedly marginalized the
country’s English-speaking population”); U.N. Condemnation of India Internet
Restrictions, supra note 86 (noting that the shutdowns followed protests in
impacted regions and explaining that there has been approximately 31 cases of
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Ukraine’s ban is most similar to Turkey’s ban because it is being
enforced during a period of active violent conflict with an external
entity. The conflict context could justify a valid national security
exception.124
Following investigations into Turkey’s internet
restrictions, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of
opinion and expression determined that some of the controls were
justified under Article 19(3): attacks in Turkey by ISIS and the PKK,
coupled with an attempted coup in 2016 qualified Turkey to apply
the Article 19(3) national security exception.125 However, Turkey’s
ban on over 100,000 websites was not considered proportional or
necessary in combating the external security threat.126
Ukraine claims that its ban is necessary to combat the force of
Russia and its “hybrid war.”127 However, neither Turkey nor
Ukraine’s bans are aimed at addressing the underlying threat, but
simply target the symptoms of the threat.128 Turkey’s internet
shutdowns suppress government critique and freedom of expression
on media platforms fundamental to democratic life, not the potential
threat posed by terrorism or violent coup.129
Similarly, Ukraine has been the target of alleged Russian hacking
through a number of cyber platforms unrelated to Russian-owned
social media and Internet platforms.130 The Russian-owned platforms
banned by Ukraine contribute to pro-Russian dialogue and
social media or Internet bans in Kashmir and Jammu since 2012).
124. See Luhn, supra note 2 (citing President Poroshenko’s statement is saying
that Ukraine’s social media and internet ban is a product of the “hybrid war” with
Russia); see also Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note
86 (citing attacks by ISIS and PKK as reasoning for shutdowns and explaining that
Turkey has good reason for national security concerns but its actions are not
proportional to those concerns).
125. Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note 86.
126. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Turkey, supra note 87, ¶¶ 49, 75.
127. Luhn, supra note 2 (quoting President Poroshenko as describing Russia’s
armed aggression and cyberattacks as “hybrid war”).
128. See Zinets, supra note 38 (worsening relations between Kiev and Moscow);
see also Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note 86
(discussing how Turkey’s restrictions overwhelmingly and disproportionately
touch “every aspect of public and private life in the country”).
129. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Turkey, supra note 87, ¶ 7.
130. See Zinets, supra note 38 (involving hack attacks against the Ukrainian
defense and finance ministries).
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sentiments among Ukrainian citizens.131 Ukraine’s suppression of
this dialogue is similar to the censorship in Turkey that the U.N.
determined to be undemocratic and violative of ICCPR Article 19.132
Turning to Cameroon, both Cameroon and Ukraine targeted
speakers of particular languages.133 Cameroon’s internet shutdown
following protests over the treatment of English-speaking citizens
limited the freedom of expression of specifically English-speakers.134
Similarly, Ukraine’s ban limits the expression of Russian-language
speakers, who may be considered as more likely to speak out against
the Ukrainian government and in support of the Russian
government.135 The U.N. condemned Cameroon for targeting
English-speaking citizens, and Cameroon accordingly ended its
internet shutdown in its northwest and southwest regions.
Finally, India, like Cameroon, targeted specific regions within the
country to shutdown internet access.136 India’s internet restrictions
also took place following widespread government protests in Jammu
and Kashmir.137 While Ukraine’s ban does not target specific
regions, eastern Ukrainians are disproportionately affected because
they are more likely to choose Russian-language platforms, to speak
out against Ukraine on social media, and rely on the VK and other
banned social media platforms to communicate about the ongoing
131. See Bershidsky, supra note 25 (explaining that Russian-owned platforms
are preferred by eastern Ukraine separatists and individuals with pro-Russian
views).
132. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Turkey, supra note 87, ¶ 7
(explaining that Turkey’s restrictions lead it away from being a democratic nation
as these restrictions lead to censorship of criticism of the government).
133. Compare Bershidsky, supra note 25 (detailing how sites banned by
Ukraine feature Russian-language friendly settings and communities that may not
be found on Facebook and Twitter), with U.N. Condemnation of Cameroon
Internet Restrictions, supra note 86 (noting that the Internet shutdown occurred in
predominantly English-speaking regions where protests regarding the treatment of
English-speakers took place).
134. U.N. Condemnation of Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86.
135. See Dickinson, supra note 112 (remarking that some Russian-speaking
Ukrainians embraced Russian occupation in the conflict zones).
136. See U.N. Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86
(targeting Kashmir and Jammu since 2012); see also U.N. Condemnation of
Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86 (targeting the northwest and
southwest regions).
137. U.N. Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86.

2018]

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND OPINION IN WARTIME

965

Russian-Ukrainian conflict.138
While Ukraine’s internet restrictions share similarities with these
other condemned nations, Ukraine’s ban is different in that it applies
only to Russian-owned internet platforms and still allows Ukrainians
in all regions to access Facebook, Twitter, and other social media
alternatives.139 Turkey, India, and Cameroon all implemented
sweeping internet shutdowns that go beyond the scope of Ukraine’s
Russian-owned social media ban because their bans quashed any
online freedom of expression in impacted areas, whereas Ukraine’s
ban applies only to particular websites.140 The United Nations
condemned Turkey, India, and Cameroon for their violations of
Resolution 32/13, and ICCPR Article 19 because their actions were
not necessary or proportional to any national security need.141 While
Ukraine’s ban is less expansive, it is still not proportional or
necessary as required by Article 19, and clearly violates Article 19.142

C. UKRAINE CANNOT CLAIM EXCEPTION
UNDER ICCPR ARTICLE 19(3)
To meet the established requirements of Article 19(3)’s national
security exception, Ukraine must demonstrate the necessity and
proportionality of Ukraine’s Internet ban as a response to a specified
138. See Koshiw, supra note 4 (explaining that eastern Ukrainians use banned
social media to communicate about fighting).
139. See Luhn, supra note 2 (explaining the scope of Internet platforms banned
by decree); see also Sharkov, supra note 42 (noting increased Ukrainian use of
Facebook following ban).
140. See Bershidsky, supra note 25 (arguing alternatively that Ukrainians can
still speak on other platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube);
see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Turkey, supra note 87 (banning
access to over 100,000 websites); U.N. Condemnation of India Internet
Restrictions, supra note 86 (banning complete Internet access to particular
regions); U.N. Condemnation of Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86
(banning complete Internet access to particular regions).
141. Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note 86
(citing the ICCPR in explaining that Turkey does not qualify for a national security
exception); U.N. Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86
(citing U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 32/13 in urging India to cease infringing
on citizen rights to freedom of expression); U.N. Condemnation of Cameroon
Internet Restrictions, supra note 86 (citing U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 32/13
in condemning Cameroon).
142. See discussion infra Part III.D.
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threat and show the action taken is legal under Ukrainian law.143 The
Ukrainian ban fails to meet this standard. While the Russian
cyberwarfare threat is well-founded, the Russian threat through
social media platforms is not proportional to the impacts of the ban
because the cyberattacks are not actually connected to the banned
platforms.144 Furthermore, Ukraine’s ban is unnecessary because it
does not address the problems facing Ukraine and it is potentially
harmful to Ukrainian citizens.145 Justifications for the ban would also
need to overcome the fact that Ukraine’s ban has placed Ukrainians
in the conflict zones in more danger, as it removes citizens’ principle
mechanism for communication.146
1. Necessity and Proportionality in Relation to Russian
Cyberattacks
The most prominent Russian hacking incidents have not occurred
through social media and Internet platforms in a way that would
merit implementation of the social media ban.147 Russia has attacked
Ukraine through its state institutions including the regional power
grid, its finance and defense ministries, and its State Treasury.148 In
announcing the internet ban, President Poroshenko cited Russia’s
hybrid form of warfare, in which Russia engages in both cyber and
physical conflict, and Russia’s meddling in the French election as
justification.149 Neither of these Russian actions connect to the ban
143. General Comment No. 34, supra note 45, ¶ 34.
144. See Luhn, supra note 2 (explaining the widespread use of sites banned by
Ukraine); see also Zinets, supra note 38 (remarking on the many times Russia has
allegedly cyberattacked Ukraine’s infrastructure in a two-month span and showing
the many outlets through which Ukraine is attacked).
145. See Zinets, supra note 38 (showing that cyberattacks on Ukraine are not
connected with Russian social media and search engines); see also Koshiw, supra
note 4 (highlighting the importance of VK use in conflict zones).
146. See Koshiw, supra note 4 (explaining that “both residents and the
authorities rely on Vkontakte posts to disseminate the latest reports on the
fighting.”).
147. See Zinets, supra note 38 (noting that Ukraine has been the target of
alleged Russian hacking throughout their cyberwar with one report from Ukraine
stating that Ukrainian institutions had been hacked approximately 6,500 times in a
two-month span of time).
148. Id.
149. See Bershidsky, supra note 25 (quoting Poroshenko’s VK post in which he
referenced hybrid war and the French election campaign interference).
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on Russian-owned websites.150
Ukraine cannot claim a national security exception on the basis of
necessity under the hybrid war rationale because cyberattacks have
not occurred through Russian-owned social media.151
Ukraine’s national security argument is similar to Turkey’s
rationale (ultimately rejected by the U.N.) in claiming that external
attacks from ISIS or PKK can somehow be tied to large-scale social
media shutdowns.152 However, Turkey’s expansive actions were
disproportionate to the interest allegedly being protected because
they involved complete Internet and media shutdowns designed to
end government criticism rather than fight terrorism.153 Similarly,
while Ukraine may have a legitimate national security concern
regarding cyberattacks, the protective action taken is over-intrusive
since it is clear social media sites are not Russia’s primary
mechanism for cyberattack.154
Ukraine fails to demonstrate a connection between the internet
platforms and Russian cyberattacks.155 Therefore, Ukraine cannot
meet the necessity and proportionality requirements of ICCPR
Article 19(3) with regard to its national security cyberattack
rationale.156
2. Proportionality and Intrusive Government Restrictions in
Relation to Data Collection
Ukraine cannot claim that data collected by the Russian
government through these Russian-owned internet platforms is a
150. See Zinets, supra note 38 (showing how Russian cyberattacks occur
through a variety of mechanisms without reference to social media platforms).
151. Id.
152. See Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note 86
(explaining that while Turkey does face threats from ISIS and PKK and it can take
these threats into account when protecting public order and national security, its
Internet and social media shutdowns are not necessary to preventing terrorism).
153. Id.
154. See Zinets, supra note 38 (noting the systems through which Russia has
attacked Ukraine); see also Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra
note 86 (stressing that a ban that is characteristic of collective punishment against
citizens violates freedom of expression under the ICCPR).
155. Zinets, supra note 38.
156. ICCPR, supra note 8, at 178.
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security threat because most users have data of little value to the
Russian government.157 Even where VK has collected data for the
Russian government, the data was simply public information.158
Some Ukrainian politicians cite the collection of information on
soldiers and government employees as reason for supporting the
ban.159 However, given the large number of Ukrainian citizens who
use the banned sites, concern regarding a small number of people
who might potentially have valuable information is not a sufficiently
valid justification for such a widespread ban.160
Article 19(3) requires that actions be specifically constructed to
achieve the state’s protective function and be the least intrusive
function for protective achievement.161 The Special Rapporteur
expanded on the definition of intrusiveness in Turkey’s case by
stating that Turkey’s actions could be considered least intrusive if
requests for removal of internet content were restricted to “actual
cases of incitement” that threaten national security.162
Ukraine claims it is trying to protect against the acquisition of data
that can lead to national security risks, but broadly banning all
citizens from using these websites is an overly intrusive and
unnecessary action for protecting national security.163
3. Necessity and Proportionality in Relation to Propaganda
Ukraine’s concern regarding Russian utilization of internet
platforms to spread propaganda does not prevail over a citizen’s right
to freely seek and impart information on the Internet. While
evidence does show that the Russian-owned platforms disseminate or
157. See Luhn, supra note 2 (explaining that VK is intrusive and cooperative
with the Russian government, but not a security threat because most data that can
be collected is public information).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. (showing the popularity of banned sites in Ukraine with millions of
Ukrainians using them).
161. General Comment No. 34, supra note 45, ¶ 34.
162. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Turkey, supra note 87, ¶ 80.
163. See Luhn, supra note 2; see also General Comment No. 34, supra note 45,
¶ 34 (defining the requirements for proportionality, including the requirement that
restrictions enacted for national security be the least restrictive possible for
achieving the state’s security goal).
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restrict content to present more favorable information on Russia,
these actions do not serve a sufficient national security justification
for banning the websites.164
Firstly, social media and internet users already tend to self-select
what information they will view and often join online communities
with similar views.165 Individuals on VK may have pro-Russia
sentiments and may tend to rely more on information supporting
those sentiments, but these views are part of their right to freedom of
opinion and not likely to change with a ban on VK.166
Secondly, a government cannot ban websites for expressing
unfavorable views of that government.167 Turkey, India, and
Cameroon all shutdown social media and internet access following
political unrest.168 The U.N. condemned each of these actions seeing
them as violations of rights to opinion, expression, and information
without justification under the ICCPR.169 Ukraine’s ban is similar in
its attempt to quiet the expression of pro-Russian views.170
Expression or receipt of disagreeable information is not a national
security risk, and banning Russian-owned social media sites for such
164. Bershidsky, supra note 25 (explaining that the Yandex algorithm seemingly
hides unfavorable news regarding the Russian government).
165. Burnside, supra note 29 (supporting how information silos develop as
individuals select what information they want to receive).
166. See UKR. CONST. art. 34, para. 1 (“To each a right to freedom is guaranteed
thoughts and words, on free expression of the looks and persuasions.”); see also
ICCPR, supra note 8, at 178 (“Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference.”); Bershidsky, supra note 25 (writing that VK’s audiences
has historically been “a younger, more pro-Russian audience than other social
networks”).
167. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 45, ¶ 9 (“All forms of opinion
are protected, including opinions of a political, scientific, historic, moral or
religious nature.”).
168. Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note 86
(noting that shutdowns took place following attempted coup and aggression from
external threats); U.N. Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86
(explaining that shutdowns occurring after political protests); U.N. Condemnation
of Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86 (explaining that shutdowns
followed political protests).
169. See, e.g., Preliminary Conclusions and Observations on Turkey, supra note
86; U.N. Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86; U.N.
Condemnation of Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86.
170. See Luhn, supra note 2 (noting that websites ban by Ukraine are popular
with individuals holding anti-Ukraine views).
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a reason is not acceptable under ICCPR Article 19.171
4. Decree Implementation as a Violation of Ukrainian Law
The implementation of Ukraine’s decree is a violation of
Ukraine’s own laws making it an unlawful act inside the country.172
Ukrainian law holds that internet restrictions cannot be implemented
without a court decision.173 General Comment No. 34 explains that
“[r]estrictions must be provided by law.”174 However, “[a] law may
not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of freedom of
expression on those charged with its execution.”175 The Presidential
Decree enacting the social media and Internet ban grants expansive
power in the implementation of the widespread ban, and ignores
existing Ukrainian law regarding internet restrictions.176

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. UKRAINE SHOULD CEASE IMPLEMENTATION OF RUSSIANOWNED WEBSITE BAN
Ukraine’s internet site ban is in violation of ICCPR Article 19;
therefore, Ukraine should cease implementation of the ban
immediately.177 Under ICCPR Article 19, Ukraine is expected to
maintain rights to freedom of expression, opinion, and information
regardless of frontiers.178 The Russian-owned internet platform ban
limits Ukrainian access to different outlets of expression and targets
websites that may express pro-Russian sentiments.179 Russian171. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 45, ¶ 21.
172. See Luhn, supra note 2 (expressing need for a court decision for
implementation of Internet access restrictions); General Comment No. 34, supra
note 45, ¶ 22.
173. Luhn, supra note 2.
174. General Comment No. 34, supra note 45, ¶ 22.
175. Id.
176. Luhn, supra note 2; The Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 133/2017,
INT’L MASSMEDIA AGENCY (May 18, 2017), https://intmassmedia.com/
2017/05/18/the-decree-of-the-president-of-ukraine-6SOOQlSKm sTW.,W8Y ^]_/ees
rendered invalid by this presidential decree and listing institutions impacted by the
ban).
177. ICCPR, supra note 8, at 178.
178. Id.
179. Bershidsky, supra note 25 (explaining what websites are banned by the
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speaking Ukrainian citizens who prefer the Russian-language
friendly social media sites and Ukrainians living in conflict zones
who use these social media sites to update people about the conflict
are disproportionately harmed by this ban.180 Furthermore, the largescale nature of the ban and the absence of a legal mechanism in
Ukraine to implement the ban using principles of due process,
demonstrate that Ukraine has not met the standard explained under
General Comment No. 34.181
Should the Ukrainian government insist on restricting certain
portions of the internet, this must be done through Ukraine’s
courts.182 Given that blocking website access can only be done
through court decision in Ukraine, the Ukrainian government should
go to its court system to determine on a legal and proportional level
whether and how access restrictions may be implemented to be in
compliance with the ICCPR.183
Proportionality should look similar to suggestions made by the
Special Rapporteur regarding Turkey’s internet shutdowns in which
the Special Rapporteur recommended that internet content
takedowns be limited to actual cases of incitement.184 In Ukraine’s
case, this would mean limiting access restriction where individuals
(or content) inciting actual violence, or limiting access for
individuals who hold sensitive information. Until the Ukrainian
government complies with its own legal mechanisms for
implementing the ban, it should cease implementation and conform
to the ICCPR.185

Ukraine and how these sites attract pro-Russian views holders).
180. Id.
181. Luhn, supra note 2 (noting the application of the decree to VK,
Odnoklassniki, Mail.ru, and Yandex, among other Russian services, and
referencing Mykhailo Chaplyga’s comment regarding the requirement of a court
decision for Internet access restrictions); General Comment No. 34, supra note 45,
¶ 22 (requiring restrictions of freedom of expression under Article 19(3) national
security exception be legal, proportional, and necessary).
182. Luhn, supra note 2 (quoting Mykhailo Chaplyga’s comment regarding the
requirement of a court decision for Internet access restrictions).
183. Id.
184. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Turkey, supra note 87, ¶ 80.
185. Id.
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B. THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE SHOULD
CLARIFY THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 19 AND CONDEMN UKRAINE’S
INTERNET RESTRICTIONS THROUGH GENERAL COMMENT, FIRST
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL POWERS, OR PRESS RELEASE
As a party to the ICCPR and the First Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR, the HRC may reprimand Ukraine for its actions.186 Ukraine
may also face reprimand from the Human Rights Council or through
Reports filed by a Special Rapporteur as seen with Turkey, India,
and Cameroon. However, the HRC specifically enforces the ICCPR
while the Human Rights Council and Special Rapporteur more
broadly assess human rights around the globe.187
Accordingly, the HRC should exercise its monitoring and
reviewing powers to issue a general comment clarifying the proper
application of the Article 19(3) national security exception.188 While
General Comment No. 34 does explain the standard for the national
security exception, a general comment addressing Internet access
bans during cyber-conflict would further the international
community’s understanding of the interaction between modern
conflict and international law.189 As cyberwarfare continues to
evolve and become increasingly part of international conflicts, it is
important that the HRC address how rights to information should be
protected in instances of cyberwarfare, which is closely connected
with the dissemination and collection of information.
Furthermore, a general comment related to Ukraine’s ban could
potentially create the pressure necessary from the international
community to push Ukraine into reversing the ban.190 The United
186. First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, supra note 58.
187. See U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMM’R, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/HRCIndex.aspx
(explaining that the U.N. Human Rights Council bears responsiblity for protecting
all human rights around the world); see also Human Rights Comm., U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS:
OFFICE
OF
THE
HIGH
COMM’R,
http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx (explaining that the Human Rights
Committee specifically monitors implementation of the ICCPR).
188. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 63.
189. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 45.
190. See Kazeem, supra note 103 (explaining how the U.N.’s statement on
Cameroon’s Internet shutdown created the pressure needed for Cameroon to end
the shutdown).
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States and the Council of Europe have spoken out against Ukraine’s
actions. Particularly, Council of Europe Secretary-General Thorbjorn
Jagland said, in response to Ukraine’s actions, that “blanket bans are
out of line with the principle of proportionality.”191 However,
condemnation from the United Nations would lend legitimacy to
criticisms of the ban.
Additionally, the HRC may review individual complaints under its
First Optional Protocol powers.192 Upon review of complaints, the
HRC may issue views finding Ukraine in violation of the ICCPR
similar to the views issued by the Special Rapporteur regarding
Turkey’s Article 19 ICCPR violations.193 The HRC could then
monitor Ukraine to determine how Ukraine will implement changes
based on its recommendations.194 The HRC can choose to increase
its field presence in Ukraine and engagement with Ukraine to
encourage change.195
The United Nations may also distribute a press release urging
Ukraine to cease implementation of the ban, similar to the U.N.’s
reaction to internet shutdowns in India and Cameroon.196 Such an
action could lead to pressure on Ukraine without having to go
through the general comment procedure. While a general comment
can be effective in encouraging change in Ukraine and clarifying
191. See Council of Europe: Sanctions on Russian Sites Violate Freedom
Principles, KYIV POST, supra note 7 (explaining that Europe Secretary-General
Thorbjorn Jagland found that this ban goes against freedom of expression); US
Scrutinizes Ukraine Ban on Russian Websites, VOA NEWS, supra note 42 (quoting
a U.S. State Department official saying, “We call on the Ukrainian government to
find a way to protect its national interests that does not undermine its constitutional
principles”).
192. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 63
(listing the options that the Human Rights Committee has for enforcing the
ICCPR).
193. Id.; Report of the Special Rapporteur on Turkey, supra note 87.
194. See What We Do, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhatWeDo.aspx
(noting that field offices in member states help in “developing responses to human
rights challenges”).
195. See id. (explaining that field offices are prepared to implement technical
trainings and can support member states in “administration of justice, legislative
reform, human rights treaty ratification, and human rights education”).
196. See Condemnation of India Internet Restrictions, supra note 86; U.N.
Condemnation of Cameroon Internet Restrictions, supra note 86.
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Article 19(3) in the future, a press release may have an immediate
effect of bringing more public notice to the issue.
While
condemnations of India and Turkey have not led to policy changes,
Cameroon did lift its internet restrictions in its English-speaking
northwest and southwest regions following the U.N.’s press release
and subsequent international pressure condemning the restrictions.197
Under the HRC’s powers, it should condemn Ukraine and encourage
pressure similar to that which led Cameroon to end its internet
shutdown.198

C. UKRAINE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE USE AND DEVELOPMENT
OF NON-RUSSIAN INTERNET OPTIONS
Ukraine should respect the ICCPR in giving its citizens the
freedom to express themselves and seek and impart information on
Russian internet platforms; however, this does not mean that Ukraine
cannot encourage and incentivize use of alternative options.199 Since
the announcement of the ban on the social media sites,
approximately two and a half million Ukrainians have created
Facebook profiles, showing that some Ukrainians are willing to
change platforms.200 Now, the government needs to encourage this
trend rather than force it. However, some Ukrainians cannot or will
not switch to a platform like Facebook. Where this is the case,
Ukraine should allow continued use of the Russian-owned sites until
Ukrainians have had the time to develop comparable replacements,
or until Ukrainian businesses have had the time to rebuild their
profile popularity on alternative sites.201
197. See Kazeem, supra note 103 (remarking that Cameroon ended its Internet
shutdown following condemnation by the U.N.).
198. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 63
(outlining how the HRC may make statements when a nation violates the ICCPR);
Kazeem, supra note 103.
199. See Sharkov, supra note 42 (demonstrating that Ukrainian citizens can
access other social media options); see also Valentin Petrov: If Domestic
Enterprises Start Operating on the Domestic Software Product, Ukraine’s Added
Value Will Be Increased, NAT’L SECURITY & DEF. COUNCIL UKR. (May 17, 2017),
http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/en/news/2766.html
(stating
that
private
sector
development of domestic software products would stimulate the economy).
200. Sharkov, supra note 42 (reporting on the increase in Ukrainian Facebook
accounts resulting from the ban).
201. Bershidsky, supra note 25 (explaining that some Ukrainians prefer that
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There has already been interest from the National Security and
Defense Council (NSDC) regarding the economic benefits of private
Ukrainian businesses developing and utilizing domestic software.202
After the implementation of the decree, the Head of Service on
Issues of Information Security of the NSDC Staff, Valentin Petrov,
stated, “[i]f our private sector understands that it is better to work
with the domestic software product, this will stimulate our economy,
increase our added value. . . .”203
This statement indicates
government interest in private Ukrainian development of domestic
products, which could include the development of software for
business operations and social media platforms.204 If the Ukrainian
government were to incentivize private development of domestic
platforms for expression through legislation that creates financial
support for domestic private sector startups, it may have more
success in having citizens migrate away from Russian-owned sites
while maintaining legitimacy and legality.
Furthermore, the internet ban distracts from governmental
legitimacy in Ukraine, whereas as campaign encouraging
development of domestic platforms would not create as many
questions of legitimacy.205 Those who have criticized the ban have
compared Ukraine to Russia, noting that Ukraine has taken to
“emulating Russia’s repression.”206 While others have discussed
Ukraine’s initiation into “a nice club,” joining “Russia, Myanmar,
Vietnam, Tunisia, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, North Korea” in
blocking access to social media networks.207 Allowing access the
these sites, but engaging use and development of alternative
platforms may help to legitimize the government as the European
Russian-language platform of VK and would not like to switch to another
platform).
202. Valentin Petrov: If Domestic Enterprises Start Operating on the Domestic
Software Product, Ukraine’s Added Value Will Be Increased, supra note 199.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Ukraine: Revoke Ban on Dozens of Russian Web Companies, supra note 7
(claiming that President Poroshenko is attempting to control public discourse).
206. Koshiw, supra note 4 (quoting from Kenneth Roth of the Human Rights
Watch in a Twitter post).
207. Bershidsky, supra note 25 (quoting Sevgil Musaeva, editor of Ukraine’s
Ukrainskaya Pravda).
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democracy it claims to be.

V. CONCLUSION
Ukraine’s ban of the social media sites VK and Odnoklassniki, the
email service Mail.ru, and the search engine Yandex, is a violation of
its obligation under ICCPR Article 19. The ban does not meet the
requirements of Article 19(3)’s national security exception because it
is not necessary, proportional, or legal in relation to the rights of
Ukraine’s citizens and Ukraine’s cybersecurity objective. Ukraine
should cease implementation of this ban, consider alternative options
for combatting Russia’s cyberwarfare, and the HRC should condemn
the ban. Ukraine’s Internet platform ban demonstrates a failure to
respect its citizens’ rights to freedom of expression and access to
information; however, through a reversal of the current ban, there is
still an opportunity for Ukraine to ensure the security of its citizens
and their rights.

